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Anderson and vanWincoop (2003) developed what has become the standard framework for 
framing and interpreting empirical work using the gravity model. Its main advantage is that it 
recognizes and tackles the issue of endogeneity of prices. Hoverer, two shortcomings of their 
framework are that 1) it relies heavily on an assumption of symmetry among countries; and 2) it 
requires nonlinear estimations.  For issues related to North-South trade, the assumption of 
symmetry is problematic.  In this paper we develop an asymmetric extension of the Anderson-
vanWincoop framework appropriate to the analysis of North-South trade.  To avoid nonlinear 
estimations, we also use an appropriately extended version of Baier and Bergstrand’s (2006) 
method of estimating a linear approximation to the model—thus permitting estimation using 
(“good old”) OLS and easily compute comparative statics. As an illustration of its use, we 
examine the empirical link between foreign aid and trade.  The results are striking. The 
coefficients are positive and significant, matching a long list of empirical results in the aid and 
trade literature. However, the comparative statics shows that aid affects prices so as to reduce 
the volume of trade of non-donor Northern exporters.  Since most Northern countries are non-
donors, the total volume of exports from the North actually decreases. 
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Anderson and vanWincoop (2003) developed what has become the standard framework for framing and 
interpreting empirical work using the gravity model. Its main advantage is that it recognizes and tackles 
the issue of endogeneity of prices. Hoverer, two shortcomings of their framework are that 1) it relies 
heavily on an assumption of symmetry among countries; and 2) it requires nonlinear estimations.  For 
issues related to North-South trade, the assumption of symmetry is problematic.  In this paper we develop 
an asymmetric extension of the Anderson-vanWincoop framework appropriate to the analysis of North-
South trade.  To avoid nonlinear estimations, we also use an appropriately extended version of Baier and 
Bergstrand’s (2006) method of estimating a linear approximation to the model—thus permitting estimation 
using (“good old”) OLS and easily compute comparative statics. As an illustration of its use, we examine 
the empirical link between foreign aid and trade.  The results are striking. The coefficients are positive and 
significant, matching a long list of empirical results in the aid and trade literature. However, the 
comparative statics shows that aid affects prices so as to reduce the volume of trade of non-donor 
Northern exporters.  Since most Northern countries are non-donors, the total volume of exports from the 





The gravity model has become a major tool in empirical international economics.  Part of 
the reason for this is the model’s success in accounting for trade patterns, but the boom in 
new use of gravity modeling came with the development of solid theoretical 
foundations.
1  A major advance in the development of these theoretical foundations came 
with the fundamental paper by Anderson and van Wincoop (AvW, 2003), who clarify the 
appropriate way to incorporate barriers to trade, broadly speaking, in the gravity 
framework. Before this seminal contribution, the traditional gravity equation 
specification ignored that the volume of trade between two countries is not only 
influenced by their bilateral trade costs but also by trade costs between these two 
countries  relative to the total volume of trade among all countries. Alternatively, as 
nicely argued by Baer and Bergstrand (2007, page 5): 
 
“In reality, the trade flow from i to j is surely influenced by the prices of products in the 
other N–2 regions in the world, which themselves are influenced by the bilateral distances 
(and EIAs, etc.) of each of i and j with the other N–2 regions.”
2 
 
On the other hand, as is well known, AvW relied on strong symmetry assumptions in 
deriving their framework.  In many applications (e.g. border effects between countries at 
a similar level of economic development) these assumptions seem quite plausible.   
However, in applications with an explicit North-South component, symmetry seems 
problematic. 
 
One such application is the study of the link between trade and aid.  The goal of this 
paper is to develop an asymmetric version of the AvW model appropriate to applications 
explicitly involving developed and less developed countries.  Since aid is usually a 
transfer from developed to less developed countries, the AvW approach to the gravity 
equation, as proposed by AvW (2003) needs to be re-derived in the presence of such 
                                                 
1 Fundamental papers here include: Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985, 1989), and Helpman (1987). 
Deardorff (1998) provides a useful discussion of the wealth of theoretical foundations available, while 
Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (1999), Evenett and Keller (2002), and Haveman and Hummels (2004), 
among others, seek to evaluate these various foundations empirically. 
2 By EIAs the authors mean economic integration agreements. 
  
2 
transfers and where the North produces differentiated goods and the South homogenous 
ones. It is argued here that these different structures better characterize developed and 
less developed countries (see also Helpman, 1999). 
 
The next section seeks to situate the research reported here relative to the existing 
literature on the trade-aid link and some of the related work on the gravity model; then 
we present our extension of AvW to the asymmetric North-South case; this is followed 
by a discussion of the econometric method [an application of Baier and Bergstrand’s 
(B&B, 2007) OLS-based implementation of the AvW model]; this is followed by a 
presentation of results; and the paper concludes.  By building on the work of AvW and 
B&B, the extension developed here increases the efficiency of estimation and allows us 
to better interpret the results. We believe that this provides an empirical model that is 
better suited to the analysis of North-South trade issues like the link between trade and 
aid. 
 
2) Trade, Aid, and the Gravity Model 
 
The literature on foreign aid and how it is related to trade is vast. In particular, the issue 
of causality between these two variables has received a lot of attention.
3  Probably the 
most widely held view is that aid causes trade, and the most direct channel for this effect 
is that aid is often tied to exports by a formal agreement. However, while the proportion 
of bilateral aid that was tied or partially tied in the early 1990s was something like 50% 
(Wagner, 2003), such practices were discouraged by various international organizations 
and, by the late 1990s, this form of aid had been reduced to 17.7% of the total (Tajoli, 
1999).  
 
When aid is not formally tied, there remain at least two reasons to expect a causal link 
from aid to trade. The first, presuming that aid increases income, is that an increase in the 
income of the recipients results in an increase in their imports (McGillivray and 
                                                 
3 Our discussion here abstracts from the enormous theoretical literature on the link between transfers and 
trade.  For an excellent survey see Brakman and van Marrewijk (1999).  
3 
Morrissey, 1998; Lahiri, Raimondos-Moller, 1997; Lloyd et al., 2000). The second is 
actually a collection of many different arguments that, for the purpose of this paper, can 
all be seen as establishing some kind of “economic and political link”
4 between donors 
and recipients. For instance, the recipient country may feel obligated to buy from the 
donor to maintain “good will” and secure the continuity of the aid flow (Wagner, 2003, 
page 158, also McGillivray and Morrissey, 1998, Lloyd et al., 2000). Alternatively, a 
donor may choose to finance development projects that require supplies from industries 
in which the donor is strong (Wagner, 2003). Besides, once the donor starts exporting to 
the recipient, there is an increase in the recipient’s exposure to goods from the donor, 
which may result in future exports (Osei et al., 2004). 
 
In contrast, there is also a line of research that favors the opposite direction of causality: 
from trade to aid. Most of this research consists of models that aim to explain the 
allocation of aid. In such models, donors prefer to allocate their aid to countries with 
which they have the greatest commercial links. This possibly reflects the influence of 
lobby groups (McGillivray and Morrissey, 1998; Lloyd et al., 2000; Osei et al., 2004; 
Morrissy et al., 1992). 
 
There is also the possibility of no relationship (Osei et al.; 2004) or a contemporaneous 
relationship of these two variables (Osei et al., 2004), which could reflect the possibility 
that different factors determine both aid and trade levels (Wagner, 2003). Finally, the 
possibility of a negative relationship has also been raised. For instance, 1) trade may be 
used by donors as an indicator of a recipient’s prosperity, so they reduce aid as trade 
increases (Osei et al., 2004); 2) a donor may use aid as a strategy to promote trade in the 
countries in which they have smaller market share (Lloyd et al, 2000); and 3) the 
substitution effect of aid: even if output growth generates an increase in the overall 
imports, the recipient can substitute among them and the bilateral trade flows may not 
increase (Osei et al., 2004).  
 
                                                 
4 The expression “bilateral economical and political link” was used by Lloyd et al. (2000, pg. 109), and it is 
used throughout this paper.   
4 
Most of the empirical studies, find some evidence of aid causing trade, at least in part of 
the sample (e.g. Osei et al., 2004; Lloyd et al., 2000; McGillivray and Morrissey, 1998; 
Morrissey et al., 1992; and Wagner, 2003). We focus on the possibility of aid causing 
trade and, like Nilsson (1997) and Wagner (2003), we use the gravity equation to address 
this issue. More specifically, we include aid as a component of the “political, cultural and 
economical link” between donor and recipient as a determinant of trade. This kind of link 
features prominently in current work on the gravity equation, allowing us to take 
advantage of, and extend, innovations in gravity modeling.  
The papers most closely related to ours are by Nilsson (1997) and Wagner (2003).  Both 
apply standard, pre-AvW, gravity methods to study the link between aid and trade.   
Nilsson looks at EU aid for the period 1975-1992, where Wagner considers a broader 
range of donors and recipients for the period 1970-1990.  As in our main specification, 
both authors estimate their models in logs, permitting them to interpret the estimated 
coefficients as elasticities.  These elasticities can then be transformed into a direct 
measure of the impact of aid on trade.  Nilsson estimates that $1 of aid generates $2.60 in 
exports from the donor to the recipient; while, in his preferred specification, Wagner 
estimates that $1 of aid generates $1.85 in exports from the donor to the recipient.  Our 
estimate is dramatically less than either of these.
5 
 
However, it is also true that most studies find strong empirical evidence that trade causes 
aid, which implies that the econometric estimations performed in this paper are 
threatened by simultaneity bias.
6 To take account of this problem we follow the 
conventional approach and instrument for current levels of aid by their lags. Since at least 
some studies suggest that one lag period may not be sufficient to address this problem 
(e.g. Lloyd et al., 2000), we present an extensive analysis considering alternative number 
of lags. 
 
                                                 
5 Note that, since both of these estimates are derived from gravity specifications that ignore the role of 
multilateral resistance, we expect our estimates of the effect of aid on trade to be smaller.  See AvW (2004, 
pg. 714) for an excellent illustration of the way that not explicitly taking multilateral resistance into account 
produces upward bias in the estimates of trade costs (border barriers in that case). 
 
6 For instance, McGillivray and White (1993), Lloyd et al. (1998), Lloyd, at al, (2000), and Osei et al. 
(2004) find such empirical evidence.  
5 
The combination of empirical success and theoretical foundations has produced a new 
wave of gravity model research that is virtually tsunamic—threatening to overwhelm 
entire areas of empirical trade research.  Not surprisingly, given its widespread use, a 
large number of theoretical, econometric and empirical issues have been raised.  For the 
purposes of this paper, two are of particular significance: the appropriate modeling of 
trade costs; and whether developed and less developed countries are, in some well-
specified sense (relative to the underlying model), different from one another.  Before 
turning to a development of the theory and method used in this paper, we comment 
briefly on both. 
 
Early work on the gravity model, deriving directly from Newton’s universal law of 
gravitation, simply took distance as a measure of resistance to trade.  While physical 
distance might well account for some resistance to trade, it was clear fairly early on that a 
variety of economically relevant (political and economic) factors were also associated 
with resistance: tariff and non-tariff protection; membership in a preferential trade 
agreement; membership in the GATT/WTO; common cultural (e.g. language), legal, or 
colonial links; etc.  These have usually been introduced as fixed effects.  One of the key 
insights from careful modeling of the relationship of trade barriers (broadly construed) to 
dyadic trade volumes is that what matters is the barriers to trade in the dyad relative to 
the average level of trade barriers (AvW 2003, 2004).  The model developed here builds 
on this essential insight. 
 
While it is certainly true that the gravity equation, in some form, can be rationalized by 
many varieties of trade model, it would appear that some version of monopolistic 
competition model is widely seen as the “natural” rationalization.
7  Given the use of this 
model to make sense of intra-industry trade, which is a major component of trade 
between highly industrialized countries but a modest component of less developed 
country trade, Helpman’s (1987) finding, confirmed in great detail by Hummels and 
                                                 
7 This perception may well have roots in early use of the gravity model to empirically represent/evaluate 
the Linder (1961) hypothesis of a link, based on taste similarity, between income similarity and trade 
volume.  The growth of evidence on the major role of intra-industry trade, especially associated with the 
important empirical work of Grubel and Lloyd (1975) and Krugman’s (1979, 1980) identification of 
monopolistic competition as a plausible account of that trade, further cemented this notion.  
6 
Levinsohn (1995), that the gravity equation performed well on samples of less developed 
countries as well as highly industrialized countries, was seen as something of a problem.  
Further empirical work seems to suggest, quite reasonably (and broadly consistent with 
Helpman and Krugman’s, 1985, more general model embedding both endowment-based 
and variety-based trade), that the various models are differentially successful at 
explaining north-north, north-south, and south-south trade (e.g. Jensen, 2000; Evenett and 
Keller, 2002; Haveman and Hummels, 2004). 
 
As a response to results of this sort, Helpman (1999) suggests a model with two kinds of 
countries: the South, which produces homogenous goods, and the North, which produces 
specialized ones. With the simplified assumption that all countries in the South are 
identical, he is able to determine the volume of trade between North and South and North 
and North
8.  However, as Haveman and Hummels (2004) argue, if producers are 
homogenous, bilateral trade is not determined since buyers are indifferent among sellers. 
Haveman and Hummels propose that trade costs provide a way out of this latter problem. 
We build directly on these insights in our attempt to include the South in the present 
model. 
 
To summarize, we propose to estimate the gravity equation as proposed by AvW (2003) 
with the following modifications. First, we will include foreign aid among the “economic 
and political links” affecting the bilateral “resistance to trade” cost factor presented by 
AvW (2003). Second, the South will be assumed to produce a homogenous good. This 
inclusion, besides justifying the use of the gravity equation in this context, provides a 
simple explanation of zero trade flows between some country pairs.  
 
 
                                                 
8 The working paper version of this paper (NBER Working paper #6752, 1998) develops the model in more 
detail. There Helpman assumes that this is an extreme condition since, without differences in the factor 
proportions in the South, there is no trade among southern countries. However, he argues that “this extreme 
formulation helps to make the main point (page 28)”. We do not need to include this restrictive assumption 
in our model.   
7 
3) Modeling Foreign Aid in an Asymmetric Gravity Model 
 
It makes sense to sort the channels through which foreign aid influences trade into direct 
and indirect effects
9. The first works through the impact of foreign aid on income. 
However, since this impact depends on the total amount of aid, it is unlikely to be 
captured in the country pair estimations used here. The second is the impact of aid on the 
“bilateral political and economic link”, discussed above, and is assumed here to be 
reflected in the “resistance to trade” cost factors, as cited in the gravity equation 
literature. We now model this second channel using AvW (2003). 
 
Inserting the South and foreign aid in the AvW (2003) model.  
 













⎝⎠ ∑  
 
In AvW, every country i is endowed with a quantity of a differentiated good.  In the 
above utility function,  ij c is the quantity of the good produced in region i and consumed 
in region j. Now consider the following modification: following the strategy of Helpman 
(1999), we assume that every country i is endowed with a quantity of good i, where 
Northern countries are endowed with one variety of a differentiated good and, as we shall 
see, Southern countries are endowed with a standardized good.
10   
 
The representative consumer has Cobb-Douglas preferences with respect to differentiated 
and homogenous goods. Differentiated goods are treated as in the AvW (2003) model: 
                                                 
9 These terms were introduced by Wagner (2003) 
10 One could include many kinds of homogeneous goods but, as will be clear, the structure of costs assumed 
here would imply that each country would buy all kinds of homogenous goods from the same southern 
countries, so the contribution is not worth the additional mathematical complication.   
8 
that is, in CES fashion; while the consumer is indifferent to the origin of the homogenous 















σ  (1) 
 
Note that i indicates the origin of the good which is either in the North (N) or South (S). 
Since goods from the South are perfect substitutes, their exponent is one, and their total 
amount is like one single good in the utility function. This function is maximized given 
the budget constraint: 
 
  ij ij ij ij j
iN iS
p cp c y
∈∈
+ = ∑ ∑  (2) 
 
As in AvW (2003), assume that for each type of good, the price can be decomposed as: 
 
  ij i ij pp t =  
 
Where p is the price of the good in its own country and t is the “resistance to trade” cost 
factor between the two countries. In the context here this means that all homogeneous 
goods, independent of their origin, have same original price. Their final price then 
depends only on t, which varies for each country pair. Assume that t is larger than one 
when j is different from i and equals one when j equals i (country’s own consumption). 
Denote the value of a demanded good by: 
 
  ij ij ij pc x =  
 
Given the symmetric way that the homogeneous good enters the utility function, demands 
can be shown to be: 
 
  () 1, i f m i n { } ij j ij i ij x yiS t t =− ∈ = % α  (3) 
                                                 


















To develop some intuition about our extension, consider the extreme case of a World 
with three countries, a large one in the North and two small ones in the South
12. In 
equilibrium, depending on the structure of tij, it may be the case that the Northern country 
buys from both Southern ones or, alternatively, that one Southern country buys from 
another and resells to the North. That is, each country will buy the homogeneous good 
only from the Southern country that supplies it for the cheapest price (presents the 
smallest resistance to trade) if, in equilibrium, it is enough for its consumption. If it is not, 
then the country will also buy from the second cheapest country and so on. This also 
implies that each country in the South consumes only its own homogeneous good. 
  
The first contribution of this set up is that, as with AvW, the inclusion of barriers to trade 
explains why the predicted trade is inflated when compared to the observed pattern; and 
given the way the South is included, the model also accounts for the observations of zero 
trade in many country pairs. In the present framework, that may happen between a 
Northern and a Southern country and between Southern countries.  
 
Production value in each country equals consumption value in the World: 
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θ =  (7) 
                                                 
12 In such extreme case the assumption  pp t ij i ij = is less likely to be true, but the argument is still valid.  
10 
The gravity equation can now be derived. Solving for ( ) pi
1−σ
 in the market clearing 

















































































⎢ ⎥ = ⎜⎟ Π ⎢ ⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎦
∑  (11) 
 
Note that the expressions above reflect the facts that: 1) each country in the North exports 
to every country in the North and in the South; and 2) each country in the South exports 
only to a subset of countries, possibly none (only internal consumption). Equation (9) is 
the multilateral resistance to export from the North (defined only for i in the North) and 
equation (11) is the multilateral resistance to import from the North (defined for j in the 
North or in the South).   
 
The bilateral resistances to trade when countries in the North import from countries in the 
South are also crucial, but in a different way. Because each country in the North imports 
from only a subset of countries in the South (possibly one), it does not face a multilateral 
resistance to import but compares every bilateral one and picks the smallest. More 
specifically, for i in the South, solving for ( ) 1− α  in the market clearing condition for the 
















Consider again equation (11). In AvW’s (2003) original model, the assumption of tt ij ji =  
leads to Π ii P =  as a solution. Unfortunately, the distinction between South and North 
introduces an asymmetry in the model such that this simplification is not sensible 
anymore. Therefore, while it made sense for AvW to aggregate “export multilateral 
resistance” and “import multilateral resistance” into a general “multilateral resistance” in 
their model, this is not the case here. 
 
To see how we handle this problem, note first that the {Pi} are considered by AvW 
(2003) as a multilateral resistance index, and the authors do not encourage interpreting 
them as consumer prices index. As they state:  
 
“We will refer to the price indexes {Pi} as “multilateral resistance variables as they 
depend on all bilateral resistances {tij}, including those not directly involving i.   (…)  
While the Pi’s are consumer price indexes in the model, that would not be a proper 
interpretation of these indexes more generally. One can derive exactly the same gravity 
equation and solution to the Pi when trade costs are not pecuniary. (…) In that case Pi no 
longer represents the consumer price index and the border barrier include home bias.” 
(page 176) 
 
Now, note that in the exports from i to j, Pj is an index related to all the goods that 
country j imports from the North and Π ian index related to all the goods country i 
exports, i in the North. In addition, note how they are symmetrically defined by (9) and 
(11): Pj  is a function of all the bilateral resistance terms of the countries i that country j 
imports from the North (relative to the export general resistance to export of each country 
i); and Π i is a function of all the bilateral resistance terms of the countries j that country i 
export to (relative to the general import resistance of each country j). Therefore, that 
leads to our interpretation of Pj and Π i as multilateral resistance to import from the North 
of country j and multilateral resistance to export of country i in the North respectively.   
12 
 
However, because these terms are nonlinear functions of each other and of tij, their 
interpretation is not as clear as we might desire. In addition, they require nonlinear 
estimation. Given that, we now apply the linearization technique proposed by B&B 
(2007). These authors use log-linear Taylor-series expansions to approximate the 
multilateral price terms in the AvW’s (2003) model in order to be able to estimate it using 
OLS. We here follow their approach as closely as possible in our asymmetric North-
South context. 
 
Applying B&B’s expansions to our model 
 
In this section, we adapt 3 versions of Taylor expansions proposed by B&B (2007) to our 
model. To begin with, the center of the expansion is a frictionless world where  1 = t . 
Next, the preceding case is generalized to a center where  1 ≥ t . This is the most general 
version, and we follow B&B (2007) and use it to compute the comparative static results.  
 
However, it will be clear that the equations we obtain in this fashion contain the GDP-
share-weighted (geometric) average of  ij t  on the RHS. Therefore, introducing such an 
expansion in the gravity equation creates endogeneity bias (B&B, 2007, page 12).  To 
address this problem, B&B (2007) use a third version of the Taylor series expansion in 
their estimations (although NOT in their comparative statics). In this version, the 
multilateral resistance to trade factors are expanded not only around a symmetric bilateral 
resistance to trade t > 1, but also around a symmetric GDP share θ = 1/N (equations 28 – 
30, page 13). We adapt a similar procedure to our model, but the center in our case is 
NN t , 
NS t ,
N θ , and 
S θ .  
NN t and 
NS t  represent trade barriers greater than one, the first 
between two countries in the North, the second between one country in the South and one 
in the North. Besides, θ
N and θ
Srepresent the average income share among countries in 















     (13) 
 
where N
N is the number of countries in the North and N
S in the South. 
 
Although we were able to adapt the procedure to our model, we encountered some 
shortcomings. First, as will be shown, to find a solution to this expansion, we need to 
approximate the arithmetic averages 
N θ  and 











= θ θ . This does not seem overly restrictive since all shares 
are positive, between zero and one.  Second, the RHS of the obtained equation, although 
it does not contain the GDP-share-weighted (geometric) average of  ij t  as before, it 
contains 
N θ  and 
S θ  (as B&B, 2007 contains θ = 1/N). Although to a much lesser degree 
(since they are almost constant over time), one may argue that 
N θ  and 
S θ can introduce 
endogeneity bias. We comment on this point further in the empirical section. 
Nevertheless, we follow B&B (2007) and use this version of the Taylor expansion in our 
estimations.  
 
The issue of price normalizations 
 
Before we proceed to the expansions, a critical point must be emphasized. Both AvW’s 
(2003) and B&B models are only solved for a given price normalization, even after the 
symmetry assumption.  To see the implications of this, consider the solution proposed by 
AvW’s (2003) where  i Π = i P . As expected, it can be easily proved that, for any constant 
λ  different from one, we can always re-normalize prices (multiplying every price byλ ) 
without changing the real bundles.  However, the equality  i Π = i P  will no longer hold
13 
despite that the symmetry assumption  ji ij t t = still does.   
 
                                                 
13 See A&W (2003), footnote 12, page 175. 
  
14 
Although this can be seen as a weakness, it gives us great flexibility, as the next section 
shows. The reason is that we can choose anyλ . In the asymmetric case of our model, 
choosing a convenient one will facilitate solving the Taylor expansion.  
 
To make this point clear, in appendix 1 we illustrate how choosing a convenient λ  
allows us to expand AvW’s (2003) original model without the asymmetry assumption.  
Since imposing symmetry is a particular case of the general expansion presented, this 
exposition shows that if we impose symmetry in addition to the price normalization 
proposed here, we are back to AvW’s (2003) and B&B’s case.  
 
Three Alternative Taylor Expansions  
 
Case 1: frictionless world (center at t = 1) 
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14 Indeed, the two equations are identical. To see that, note that, in the first equation, the RHS is constant 
for every i, and, in the second equation, RHS is constant for every j. Therefore,  Π = Πi  for every i and 
P Pj =  for every j.   
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Summing across i in the North: 
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j θ , equations (22) and (24) are identical. Consider a price 
normalization such as: 
 
 







θΠ=θ θ ∑∑ ∑  (25) 
 
To show that such price normalization is possible, note that the shares do not change with 
any price normalizations. Besides, it is proved in appendix 2 that, for any given 
equilibrium and any given λ, if we multiply every price pi by λ, we have the same real 
equilibrium (real bundles), but each  j P  is multiplied by λ and each Πi is multiplied by 
λ / 1 .  Let the multilateral resistance to trade factors in a given equilibrium (with any 
price normalization) be given by  i Π  and  j P .  Consider now a new price normalization 
and let the same indexes be denoted by  j j P P λ =
~
and  λ / ~
j j Π = Π . Given that, for a given 



































































λ      ( 2 6 )  
 
Dividing both sides by λ
α: 
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Therefore, for a given equilibrium, we can always normalize prices by the λ above and 
get the desired result. By (25) we have: 
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Case 2: Center at t > 1 – version for comparative statics 
 
















































































































































Since, at the center,  1 ~ = =
t
t
t , the system above is similar to the one in the frictionless 
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Now note that: 
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Case 3: Center at 
NN t , 
NS t , 
N θ , and 
S θ - Version for empirical estimations 
 
 








































































































P  (43) 
 
Also, note that 
 
  () ( )
σ σ σ σ σ − − − − −
Π = =




NS P t P t  (44) 
 
 
Rewriting equation the first equation (14) as: 
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σ θσ σ θσ σ ln ln ln ln ln ln ln Π
 (45) 
                                                 
15 To see that, substitute 
NN t , 
NS t , 
N θ , and 
S θ  in the first equation (14) and note that, at this center, the 
RHS becomes constant for every  i Π . Therefore, we call it  N Π .  N P  and  S P  are similarly obtained.   
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Using (42), (43), and the fact that 1 = +
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Similarly, the second equation in (14) can be expanded as: 
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Similarly, summing for every country in the South: 
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σ 1 ln . In order to achieve an approximate solution, we 
must impose the restriction that the arithmetic averages 
N θ and 
S θ are close enough to the 
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. To see why we 
need this restriction, multiply both sides of equation (49) by 
N N N θ , both sides of 
equation (50) by 
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Multiplying by (-1), and substituting into equation (48), we have: 
 


























N N N N t t N N
N N N N t t
θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
σ σ
σ σ σ σ
ln ln ln ln ln ln
ln ln ln ln ln ln ln
1 1
1 1 1 1
− − + + + +
+ + + − − − Π = Π
∑∑ ∑∑ ∑ ∑
















Using 1 = +




















Given that, after using the approximation of the arithmetic and geometric averages to 
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Substituting back in equations (46) and (47), the Northern country i’s multilateral 
resistance to export can be expressed as: 
 
 
11 1 1 1 ln ln ln ln
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NS
ii j i j i j i j NN
iN jN jS iNjN iNjS
tt t t
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−σ −σ −σ −σ −σ
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θθ
Π= θ + θ − − ∑∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (57) 
 
                                                 
16 As mentioned in A&W (2003), footnote 12, page 175, their symmetric solution implies a price 
normalization. The B&B (2006) expansion carries on this price normalization, especially after expressing  
σ − 1
j P as a function of tij, since tij are exogenous variables, and therefore, given. Our solution also implies a 
price normalization. As showed in appendix 2, none of these normalizations is problematic since they do 
not change the real bundles.   
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O the other hand, the multilateral resistance to import from the North, for j in the North 
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W Y ln 0 − = β  is constant across country pairs and is substituted by time fixed 
effects; and  j i ij ij y y x x ln ln ln ~ − − = . 
 
4) Estimation Procedures 
 
The resistance to trade term is not directly observable, so it must be substituted for by 
observable variables. As common in the gravity equation literature, we include: 1) the 
distance between the political capitals of the two countries; 2) a dummy that takes value 
of unity if the two countries share the same border; 3) a dummy that takes value of unity 
if countries have a common official language; and, the focus of our analysis, 4) foreign 
aid. Note that, unlike distance, border and language, how foreign aid is related to trade is 
a more complex question. Different channels have been proposed and those affect the 
decision of how many and which lags of aid should be included in the specification. We 
return to this question in the next section.     
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As AvW (2003) and most authors in the field do, we assume the following functional 
form for trade barriers: 
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Note that dist  is defined in a similar way. The dummy variables, on the other hand, are 
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and border  is defined similarly.  
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For most country pairs, the foreign aid variable takes the value of zero. A very small 
number is added to it so that we can use it in logarithmic form. The purpose is to 
facilitate the interpretation of the coefficient especially when compared to the GDPs’ 
coefficients (both variables are estimated in the same scale). To check for sensitivity, we 
also transform aid as in equation (62) and redo the estimations with zero aid flows. 
 
The final equation to be estimated is then: 
 
  () () ( ) ( ) 01 2 3 4 1l n1l n1 1 ij ij ij x aid dist border lang β σβ σβ σβ σβ ε =+ − + − + − + − + % (63) 
 
where i is in the North. 
 
Sources of data 
 
The foreign aid data are from the International and Development Statistics – OECD 
(2005). The GDP were obtained from World Bank (World Development Indicators –
2002). The trade data are available from Feenstra’s web page.
17 Finally, distance, 




  Each dataset has a different list of countries and adopt different codes. The 
countries that have a value for at least one year of every variable are kept in the merged 
dataset. Sometimes countries and regions are aggregated in different ways and the data 
are adapted to follow Feenstra’s codes and aggregation as closely as possible. The final 
time range, after the aggregation of datasets, is from 1962 to 2000. 
 
  The countries are classified as belonging to the North following the World Bank 
classification of “high income countries”, that is, countries with 2005 GNI per capita 
                                                 
17 (http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/fzfeens/) 
18 (http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm)  
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greater or equal to $10,726.00 dollars.
19 This classification is also used by the 
International and Development Statistics – OECD (2005) dataset. Since GNI per capita is 
not available for every country, sometimes this decision was based on other available 
information. Every other country, not considered belonging to the North, was considered 
belonging to the South.  
 
5) Estimation Results and Discussion 
 
Choosing the appropriate specification for foreign aid.  
 
The choice of an econometric specification for foreign aid, that is, how many and which 
lags to include, is a tricky problem. One must consider 1) through what channels aid 
affects trade; and 2) the possibility of simultaneity, that is, trade affecting aid.  
 
Recall the many arguments mentioned in the introduction that justify why we model aid 
as a “negative trade barrier”, or as a “political link” or “political proximity” between 
countries. Those include: 1) tied aid (Wagner, 2003);  2) the effect of an increase in 
income (McGillivray and Morrissey, 1998; Lahiri, Raimondos-Moller, 1997; Lloyd et al., 
2000); 3) that a donor may choose to finance development projects that require supplies 
from industries in which the donor is strong (Wagner, 2003); 4) the recipient country may 
feel obligated to buy from the donor to maintain “good will” and secure the continuity of 
the aid flow (Wagner, 2003, page 158, also McGillivray and Morrissey, 1998, Lloyd et 
al., 2000); 5) once the donor starts exporting to the recipient, there is an increase in the 
recipient’s exposure to goods from the donor, which may result in future exports (Osei et 
al., 2004). 
 
Considering these possible channels together, one should expect two things. First, that it 
may take some time before aid fully affects trade
20 . If the argument is that donors choose 
                                                 
19 See World Bank website at the Data and Statistics  section (http://www.worldbank.org ) 
20 As mentioned by Greene, chapter 19: “In modeling the response of economic variables to policy stimuli, 
it is expected that there will be possibly long lags between policy changes and their impacts. The length of  
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to finance development projects that require supplies from industries in which the donor 
is strong, such projects will take time to mature. If the effect of aid is through income, it 
will take time for the donated resources to be converted to imports (unless aid is tied).  
The same can be said about the recipient trying to secure continuity of aid flow and the 
recipient’s exposure to goods produced by the donor.  
 
Second, one should expect that the effects of aid to last. The dynamic behavior of income 
is extensively studied. Projects that require supplies from industries in which the donor is 
strong are also supposed to last. Similarly, the “maintenance of good will” and the 
exposure to markets are not expected to suddenly vanish. 
 
These two points imply that we must include different lags of aid, and we let the data 
determine which ones. Therefore, we start this section investigating this question. That 
allows us to concurrently tackle the issue of simultaneity between aid and trade since 
proxying aid with its own lags is a way to deal with it.   
 
In the task of determining the number of relevant lags in the model, the safest strategy is 
the general-to-specific one: include more lags than one would reasonably believe 
necessary.  However, different lags of foreign aid are severely collinear, which is 
problematic for the estimations. That can be clearly seen in the next table. 
 
Table 1: Correlation between various lags of aid 
                                                                                                                                                 
lag between changes in monetary policy and its impact on important economic variables such as output and 
investments has been a subject of analysis for several decades”. 
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lag 1 lag 2 lag 3 lag 4 lag 5 lag 6 lag 7 lag 8 lag 9 lag 10
lag 1 1.000
lag 2 0.923 1.000
lag 3 0.898 0.922 1.000
lag 4 0.876 0.896 0.921 1.000
lag 5 0.857 0.874 0.895 0.920 1.000
lag 6 0.837 0.854 0.871 0.893 0.919 1.000
lag 7 0.819 0.835 0.852 0.870 0.892 0.918 1.000
lag 8 0.801 0.815 0.832 0.850 0.868 0.889 0.917 1.000
lag 9 0.782 0.795 0.811 0.829 0.846 0.865 0.887 0.916 1.000
lag 10 0.764 0.777 0.791 0.808 0.825 0.843 0.863 0.886 0.915 1.000
Note:
1. Aid in logarithmic form (small value summed when laid level is zero). Multilateral effects included as described by equation 59.
 
 
As a result, the coefficients are highly sensitive to the inclusion of lags and have high 
standard errors even when they are jointly significant. In the next table, we show the 
coefficients and the p-values when we include from one to 10 lags. The model is 
described in equation (63). Note that multilateral effects are taken into account. Shaded 
area means significant at least at 90% level and expected sign. 
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Table 2: Coefficients and p-values of aid when different numbers of aid lags are included 
Lags of Aid 1lag 1 - 2 lags 1 - 3 lags 1 - 4 lags 1 - 5 lags 1 - 6 lags 1 - 7 lags 1 - 8 lags 1 - 9 lags 1 - 10 lags
lag 1 0.011 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.166 0.400 0.633 0.863 0.457 0.263 0.099
lag 2 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
p-value 0.000 0.012 0.060 0.115 0.156 0.126 0.202 0.275 0.297
lag 3 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
p-value 0.000 0.010 0.025 0.045 0.043 0.030 0.064 0.080
lag 4 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
p-value 0.000 0.045 0.048 0.054 0.054 0.034 0.061
lag 5 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
p-value 0.005 0.139 0.127 0.123 0.111 0.072
lag 6 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
p-value 0.060 0.184 0.252 0.193 0.165
lag 7 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value 0.507 0.943 0.951 0.942
lag 8 0.002 0.002 0.002
p-value 0.132 0.244 0.171




Sum of all coefficients 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
Obs 123907 121876 119821 117515 115165 112723 110144 107495 104714 101747
R squared 0.224 0.219 0.214 0.208 0.203 0.198 0.193 0.188 0.182 0.175
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Note: distance, dummy for border, dummy for common language, and dummies for years included. Aid and distance in logarithmic form (small 
value summed when aid level is zero). Multilateral effects included as described by equation 59. Shaded area means significance at 90% level and 
expected sign. The p-value of the joint significance of aid (all lags included) is, in every case, 0.000.  
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Although the results above are compromised due to multicollinearity, note some 
interesting features in the previous table. First, the p-value of the joint significance of aid 
is, in every case, 0.000. Second, when many lags are included, the significant coefficients 
are concentrated in between lags 3 and 6. Third, in the different specifications, the aid 
coefficients sum more or less to 0.01. Compare these sums to the coefficients obtained 
when different lags, but one at a time, are included in the model. Those are presented in 
the next table.  
 
Table 3: Estimations including a different lag of aid at a time 
Including only  lag: Coefficient p-value R2 Obs
lag 1 0.0112 0.0000 0.2236 123907
lag 2 0.0115 0.0000 0.2187 121876
lag 3 0.0117 0.0000 0.2136 119821
lag 4 0.0118 0.0000 0.2082 117515
lag 5 0.0117 0.0000 0.2030 115165
lag 6 0.0115 0.0000 0.1978 112723
lag 7 0.0111 0.0000 0.1921 110144
lag 8 0.0111 0.0000 0.1872 107495
lag 9 0.0109 0.0000 0.1808 104714
lag 10 0.0104 0.0000 0.1738 101747
Note:
1. Distance, dummy for border, dummy for common language, and dummies for years included. 
Aid and distance in logarithmic form (small value summed when laid level is zero). Multilateral 
effects included as described by equation (61).
 
 
Note that the coefficients in the table above are very close to each other and very close to 
the sum of coefficients in table 2. Analyzing the last two tables simultaneously, we can 
see that, since aid is highly multicollinear, to include more than one lag means to include 
the same information more than once. Note also that the R squared when more than one 
lag is included does not differ substantially from the above (compare table 2 with table  
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3). In addition, the coefficients of the other variables of interest (distance, dummy for 
common language, dummy for common border) do not alter significantly (not reported). 
Finally, the Akaike and Schwartz criterion both favor the inclusion off all 10 lags when 
more than one lag is included, and the tenth lag when only one lag at a time is included. 
 
Considering all these factors together, we decided to use as a proxy of the negative “trade 
barrier” caused by foreign aid its fifth lag. We are confident in our choice since: 1) the 
lag we choose (even if more than one) does not substantially interfere the comparative 
statistics results since the coefficients (or their sum) are very similar; 2) the total 
significance of foreign aid is not affected; 3) we are controlling for the possibility of 
simultaneity between aid and trade since 5 year is a fairly distant lag; and 4) we are not 
excluding as many observations as we would if we had chosen the 10
th lag and are not 
restricting our model to only the most current observations.  
 
Main Estimation Procedure Results 
 
The following results refer to the estimations of the exports from the North destined both 
to the North and to the South. Exports proceeding from the South, according to our 
model, are not determined by equation (59) but by a more complex system. Note that, 
although the trade resistance terms are crucial when determining from which country the 
homogenous good will be imported, they do not enter directly in the gravity equation 
(12). Since our focus is on the effect of foreign aid on donor exports, and because 
Southern countries are rarely donors, we do not develop a methodology for the estimation 
of (12).  
 
We start presenting in Table 1 the results of the estimation of equation (59).
21 The first 
column presents our main estimation procedure where the coefficients are obtained by 
OLS
22. All variables are significant and have the expected signs.  In particular, note that 
the presence of foreign aid increases trade. 
                                                 
21 Year fixed effects are included in every estimation. 
22 All cases are estimated by OLS except when otherwise stated.   
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For completeness, the next column presents the results for the fixed effect estimation. In 
this procedure, variables that are constant across country pairs (such as distance and the 
dummy variables for border and language) must be dropped. By (59), however, we see 
that, when the multilateral terms are included, this is not the case. This is due to the fact 
that, in contrast to Baier and Bergstrand’s (2006) linear expansion, in the asymmetric 
case the trade resistance variables are not functions of the simple averages but of the 
weighted ones (weights are θ
S andθ
N ). This is unfortunate since it means that the RHS 
variables are not completely exogenous
23.  
 
In any case, since θ
S andθ
N are almost invariant across time, distance and the dummy 
variables for border and language (accounting for the multilateral terms) are almost 
completely invariant as well, which means that their estimation by the fixed effects model 
is not ideal
24. Including them in the estimation produces coefficients with strange signs 
and magnitudes and sometimes insignificant, but the results for foreign aid, our variable 
of interest, are similar
25. Therefore, in the table below, distance and the dummy variables 
are excluded from the estimation. 
 
                                                 
23  See B&B (2006) page 18 and their concluding remarks 
24 The fixed effects model produces the same coefficients and disturbances as an OLS estimation including 
dummies for each country-pair. These dummies would be highly collinear with distance and the dummy 




25 When we include all variables, Foreign aid has coefficient 0.0115615 and p. value 0.0000. Distance, 
Border and Language have coefficients -1.072604, -14.6197and 2.2545124 (p. values of 0.00, 0.00, 0.1410) 
respectively.   
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Table 4: Main Estimation Procedure  
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
Foreign Aid 0.0117 0.0052









Joint signif. Of all regressors (p-value of F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000
Fixed country-pair effects (p-value of F-statistic) 0.0000
Fixed time effects (p-value of F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000
3. Aid is  proxied by its 5th lag.
Estimations Results - Equation (63)
Notes:
1. All variables transformed as in equations (61) and (62). The dependent variable is the trade flow minus 
the logarithmic form of both countries' GDP.
2. Time dummies included.
 
 
The first question we address is how these results compare to the ones obtained using 
B&B’s (2007) and Feenstra’s (2002) estimation procedures. The reason is, since the issue 
of multilateral barriers was raised by AvW (2003), these two methodologies are the ones 
that consistently estimate the gravity equation without the shortcomings of a nonlinear 
estimation
26. We first present B&B’s (2007) results. In the first two columns of next 
table, only Northern exporters are included. However, the symmetry assumption assumed 
in their procedure implies that the whole dataset should be used.  Therefore, the last two 
columns refer to the coefficients obtained when all Southern exporters are also included.  
 
                                                 




Table 5: B&B Estimation Procedure 
 
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
(Northern Exporters) (Northern Exporters) (Whole Sample) (Whole Sample)
Foreign Aid 0.0102 0.0089 0.022555 0.0031896
p. value (0.0000) p. value (0.0000) p. value (0.0000) p. value (0.0000)
Distance -0.0001 -0.0001473
p. value (0.0000) p. value (0.0000)
Border 1.3201 1.565564
p. value (0.0000) p. value (0.0000)
Language 0.9045 0.8254977
p. value (0.0000) p. value (0.0000)
Observations 115165 115165 269279 269279
R-squared 0.2214 0.2016
Joint signif. Of all regressors (p-value of F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Fixed time effects (p-value of F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes:
3. Time dummies included.
Estimations Results - B&B
1. As in equation (59), the dependent variable is trade flow minus the logarithmic form of both countries' GDP.
2.Although in B&B's methodology all exporters should be included, only exporters in the North are considered in the first two collomuns for comparison purposes. The third and fourth collumn present the results refering to the whole sample.
4. Aid is proxied by its 5th lag34 
 
Comparing to table 1, we first note that, including only Northern exporters, the results are 
similar except for the Border’s coefficient.  Using B&B’s procedure almost doubles this 
coefficient. That is interesting since, although not in the scope of this paper, the “border 
effect” is an important topic in the current literature. On the other hand, including the 
whole sample in the estimations, B&B’s procedure coefficients that differ substantially 
from our specification. 
 
We now present estimations according to Feenstra’s (2002) methodology, where the 
coefficients are estimated by OLS and a country dummy is included for each importer 
and for each exporter.  
 
 













Joint signif. Of all regressors (p-value of F-statistic) 0.0000
Fixed time effects (p-value of F-statistic) 0.0000
Notes:
2. Time dummies included.
Estimation Results - Feenstra
1. Variables are not transformed as in equations (61) and (62). Besides, a set of dummies is 
included for each exporter and another set for each importer. 
 
 
Except for foreign aid, the results are not so different from ours. This seems like a 
sensible result. Feenstra’s methodology is consistent under the assumption of 
monopolistic competition in all countries.  
 
Before the sensitivity analysis is presented, an important question must be considered. Do 
aid’s coefficients change over time? To address these questions, equation (59) is 
estimated for every 5-year period of our sample.
27 The results are presented in the next 
table.  
                                                 




Table 7: Estimation Procedure – Different Time-Periods 
Coefficients Observations















1. All variables transformed as in equations (61) and (62). The dependent variable 
is the trade flow minus the logarithmic form of both countries' GDP.
2. Time dummies included.
3. Aid  is proxied by its 5th lag.
Foreign Aid's Coefficients - Different Time Periods
 
 
Note that the aid coefficients decreased in the last two decades. This is expected, for 
instance, given the decrease in colonial ties and the increase in competition. We now 
present some sensitivity analysis.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis  
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We start our sensitivity analysis presenting the results of our main specification but aid is 
now in levels and transformed according to equation (62). Although the coefficient of 
foreign aid is obviously changed, its significance is not altered. All other variables 
present similar coefficients and significance.  
 
 
Table 8: Main Specification - Aid in Levels 
Foreign Aid 1.3200E-09 -1.9200E-10









Joint signif. Of all regressors (p-value of F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000
Fixed country-pair effects (p-value of F-statistic) 0.0000
Fixed time effects (p-value of F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000
Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects 
Estimation Results - Aid in Levels
Notes:
1. Variables are transformed as in equations (61) and (62),  but aid is in levels.
3. Aid is proxied by its 5th lag.
4. Time dummies included.39 
 
 
We now consider how the coefficients change when we do not include the multilateral 
effects. Note in the next table the smaller coefficient of foreign aid when only Northern 
exporters are included (first column). We have more to say about this in the comparative 
statics section.  
 
Table 9: Estimations Without the Multilateral Effects 
Pooled OLS Pooled OLS
(Northern Exporters) (Whole Sample)
Foreign Aid 0.0079 0.0191
p. value (0.0000) p. value (0.0000)
Distance -0.0001 -0.0001
p. value (0.0000) p. value (0.0000)
Border 0.9152 1.2862
p. value (0.0000) p. value (0.0000)
Language 0.9385 0.8261
p. value (0.0000) p. value (0.0000)
Observations 115165 269279
R-squared 0.2215 0.1986
Joint signif. Of all regressors (p-value of F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000
Fixed country-pair effects (p-value of F-statistic)
Fixed time effects (p-value of F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000
Estimations Results - No multilateral Effects
2. Time dummies included
Notes:
1. The equation estimated is the same as equation (63) except that the independent variables are not transformed as in 
equations (61) and (62). That is, only the bilateral effects are being considered.
3. Aid is  proxied by its 5th lag
 
 
We finish this sensitivity analysis applying to our data 2 recent methodologies of 
considerable importance in the literature. In the first, suggested by Santos Silva and 40 
 
Tenreyro (2006), the dependent variable is in levels and the independent variables are in 
logs. The Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood is used in the same set of variables as in 
our main specification. However, now all the missing values of trade are assumed zero. 
The foreign aid coefficient has again the expected sign and is significant.  The results are 
in the next table. 
 
 
Table 10: Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) Procedure 
Coefficients Coefficients
(Northern Exporters) (Whole Sample)
GDP - exporter 0.7006666 0.7628305
p. value (0.0000) p. value (0.0000)
GDP -importer 0.7700523 0.7991889
p. value (0.0000) p. value (0.0000)
Foreign aid 0.0063638 0.0099465
p. value (0.0000) p. value (0.0000)
Distance -0.0000991 -0.0001073
p. value (0.0000) p. value (0.0000)
Border 0.7986253 0.8443121
p. value (0.0000) p. value (0.0000)
Language 0.6226901 0.6694062
p. value (0.0000) p. value (0.0000)
Observations 170646 626310
Joint signif. Of all regressors (p-value of F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000
Notes:
Estimations Results - Santos Silva
1. Exports are in level. When trade is not reported, it is assumed zero. 
3. Time dummies included




Finally, we adapt to our context the methodology suggested by Wagner (2003). His 
method relies on the assumption that unmeasured variables on average affect imports in 
the same way that they affect exports. Therefore, we adapt it to our case in the following 
way. For every pair of countries, first we run an OLS regression of the exports from the 
second member of the pair to the first and compute the residuals. These are used as an 
independent variable, proxying the unobserved effects, in the main regression, that is, of 
the exports of countries from the first member of the pair to the second. In addition, to be 
able to compare our results with Wagner’s (2003), we transform our aid variable 
according to the method used in that paper.  More specifically, to take into account the 
cases that aid is zero, his specification is as follows: 
 
  { } () ( ) 12 ln  max  1, foreign aid level         No aid dummy β+ β  (64) 
 
Therefore, the effect of no aid is equal to β2 while the effect of aid is given by β1 times 
the logarithm of the foreign aid level.  The results are presented in the following table. 
 42 
 
Table 11: Wagner Estimation Results 
Coefficients Coefficients
(Northern Exporters) (Whole Sample)
ln(max{1, foreign aid}) 0.00714 -0.00514
p. value (0.0000) p. value (0.046)
No foereign aid dummy -0.03700 -0.52611
p. value (0.0000) p. value (0.0000)
Distance -0.00013 -0.00015
p. value (0.0000) p. value (0.0000)
Border 0.9074902 1.156558
p. value (0.0000) p. value (0.0000)
Language 0.9538165 0.8138
p. value (0.0000) p. value (0.0000)
Import Residual 0.2576639 0.2798
p. value (0.0000) p. value (0.0000)
Observations 86104 178820
R-squared 0.3265 0.2830
Joint signif. Of all regressors (p-value of F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000
Notes:
Estimations Results - Wagner
1. The import residual is obtained in the following way. First, a regression where trade flows, say, from country "a" to country 
"b", is obtained. The predicted error terms are the "Import residuals" and are included as an independent variable in the esti
3. Time dummies included
4. Both Aid variables are  proxied by its 5th lag
2.Variables are not transformed as in equations (61) and (62).
 
 
Our results contrast with those obtained by Wagner (2003). Considering only the 
Northern exporters (first column), the sign of the aid first term is positive and the sign of 
the second is negative. In Wagner, both signs are positive. To investigate why, we change 
our estimations such as to include his choice of variables. Different from us, the author 




j i Y Y Y / ln , in the right hand side, along with other variables such as both 
countries’ per capita incomes, remoteness indexes  and Mill’s ratio
28 (see author for 
complete list of variables and methodology). When we include the income related 
variables in the right hand side, we get results similar to his. However, as B&B (2007) 
argue, this procedure introduces endogeneity in the estimation and since the strategy of 
local linearization was developed by B&B in part to avoid this problem, we prefer our 
methodology. However, in both cases, the effect of aid is significant, and that is the point 
we are aiming to argue in this sensitivity analysis.  
 
5) Comparative Statics 
 
One of the main advantages of adapting B&B’s (2007) procedure to our case is that it 
enables us to perform comparative statics.  That turns out to be very important since the 
results are striking.  The changes in bilateral trade costs, broadly construed, caused by 
foreign aid increased the volume of exports from the donor to the recipient, as the 
positive coefficient indicates. However, it also affects the multilateral trade costs of all 
other country pairs, donors or non-donors. It turns out that such changes in the 
multilateral trade barriers cause a reduction on the volume of trade of non-donors and, 
since those constitute the majority of countries, the total volume of exports from the 
North is reduced.  We start this section with the formal derivation of the comparative 
statics and finish presenting the results. 
 
Methodology to Compute Comparative-Static Effects
29 
 
Recall that we propose the following functional forms for  ij t :  
 
 
34 12 ij ij border lang
ij ij ta i d d i s t e e
ββ ββ =  (65) 
 
                                                 
28 The Mill’s ratio is to control for the probability that trade between two countries is observed (Heckman 
procedure).  
29 Our approach follows B&B (2007) as closely as possible considering our asymmetric model. 44 
 
Note that, since foreign aid often is equal to zero, in order to obtain the logarithmic form 
we must add a small value to it. To start, we can simplify the notation by rewriting the 
equation above as: 
 
 
34 12 ij ij i border lang
ij ij ij ij t aid dist e e aid A
ββ β ββ ==  (66) 
 
Given that, introducing (66) in (8), for i in the North, we have: 
 
















On the other hand, if there were no foreign aid, the trade flow would be given by: 
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ij ij ij i i j j x xa i d P P
β ∗ ∗ −σ −σ ∗ −σ −σ −= − σ + Π − Π + −  (69) 
 
Replacing (66) in our linear expansions [equations (38) and (40)], we have that: 
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Besides, assuming no foreign aid: 
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Π=θ − σ − θ θ − σ
θ ∑∑ ∑ ∑
 (71) 
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Π− Π = − θ− σ − θ θ − σ
θ ∑∑ ∑ ∑
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Thus, as in B&B (2007), estimates of the comparative static effects do not require 
estimating  
σ − Π
1 * i  or 
σ − 1 * j P .
30  
 
The equation above is quite interesting. The first term is the bilateral effects while the 
other three account for the multilateral trade barriers. Since both shares are necessarily 
smaller than one, the last term is relatively smaller than the second and third. Therefore, 
since the coefficient of aid is positive, we expect the total effect of trade to be smaller 
than the bilateral effect.  
 
Comparative Statics Results 
 
The following tables present the simple and trade weighted percentage mean of the 
increase in Northern country exports caused by foreign aid.  Note that those were 
calculated according to (75).   
 
Starting with donors, we see a simple mean of 1.51% and trade weighted mean of 2.51% 
across the years (end of the second and third column). We can also see that this 
percentage is more or less constant.  
 
                                                 
30 For a discussion on the advantages and limitations of using the Taylor first order approximation for 
comparative statics, see B&B (2007).  47 
 
Table 12: Trade Weighted and Simple Means - Increase in Trade (Percentage) 
Donors 
Year Simple Mean (%) Weighted Mean (%) obs
1962 1.82 3.15 154
1963 1.76 3.04 174
1964 1.55 3.08 203
1965 1.47 2.98 232
1966 1.57 2.98 226
1967 1.26 2.56 270
1968 1.16 2.37 262
1969 0.97 2.34 282
1970 0.92 2.08 308
1971 1.37 2.35 321
1972 1.42 2.52 342
1973 1.61 2.61 366
1974 1.71 2.55 406
1975 1.72 2.75 456
1976 1.71 2.54 469
1977 1.72 2.59 505
1978 1.78 2.61 548
1979 1.86 2.50 590
1980 1.85 2.48 644
1981 1.68 2.39 675
1982 1.54 2.37 711
1983 1.40 2.45 724
1984 1.30 2.29 727
1985 1.16 2.25 751
1986 1.48 2.28 789
1987 1.60 2.60 827
1988 1.52 2.39 872
1989 1.42 2.33 912
1990 1.50 2.41 1037
1991 1.47 2.46 1118
1992 1.58 2.62 1166
1993 1.45 2.59 1158
1994 1.42 2.57 1192
1995 1.42 2.46 1265
1996 1.51 2.57 1274
1997 1.46 2.27 1241
1998 1.43 2.24 1246
1999 1.15 2.01 1253
2000 1.02 1.96 1250
Total 1.46 2.37 26946
 
 
On the other hand, the effects on the non-donor countries are quite different. Although 
they do not have the bilateral effect (aid is substituted by 0.0001), the multilateral effects 48 
 
are mostly negative. That can be seen in the next table. The average trade flow reduction 
by year is around 11%.  
 
Table 13: Trade Weighted and Simple Means - Increase in Trade (Percentage) 
Non-donors 
Year Simple Mean (%) Weighted Mean (%) obs
1962 -12.40 -12.27 6570
1963 -12.28 -12.23 6550
1964 -12.20 -12.16 6521
1965 -12.08 -12.06 6492
1966 -12.04 -12.10 6498
1967 -11.95 -12.06 6454
1968 -11.96 -12.04 6462
1969 -11.91 -12.00 6442
1970 -11.88 -11.95 6416
1971 -11.71 -11.99 6403
1972 -11.62 -11.83 6382
1973 -11.54 -11.87 6358
1974 -11.48 -11.87 6318
1975 -11.48 -11.75 6268
1976 -11.47 -11.80 6255
1977 -11.49 -11.80 6219
1978 -11.53 -11.73 6176
1979 -11.49 -11.87 6134
1980 -11.45 -11.88 6080
1981 -11.53 -11.79 6049
1982 -11.55 -11.86 6013
1983 -11.59 -11.90 6000
1984 -11.58 -11.99 5997
1985 -11.71 -12.08 5973
1986 -11.69 -12.06 5935
1987 -11.67 -12.02 5897
1988 -11.70 -12.03 5852
1989 -11.76 -12.04 5812
1990 -11.78 -12.12 5687
1991 -11.71 -12.36 5606
1992 -11.66 -12.34 5558
1993 -11.59 -12.27 5566
1994 -11.60 -12.04 5532
1995 -11.49 -12.15 5459
1996 -11.40 -12.20 5450
1997 -11.28 -12.19 5483
1998 -11.32 -12.10 5478
1999 -11.44 -12.23 5471
2000 -11.44 -12.21 5474
Total -11.69 -12.09 235290
 
 
Comparing the two previous tables, we can see why the overall exports from the North 





Table 14: Trade Weighted and Simple Means - Increase in Trade (Percentage) 
Total 
Year Simple Mean (%) Weighted Mean (%) obs
1962 -12.08 -10.50 6724
1963 -11.92 -10.57 6724
1964 -11.78 -10.45 6724
1965 -11.61 -10.42 6724
1966 -11.59 -10.49 6724
1967 -11.42 -10.50 6724
1968 -11.45 -10.60 6724
1969 -11.37 -10.75 6724
1970 -11.29 -10.74 6724
1971 -11.09 -10.73 6724
1972 -10.96 -10.80 6724
1973 -10.82 -10.79 6724
1974 -10.68 -10.61 6724
1975 -10.58 -10.27 6724
1976 -10.55 -10.44 6724
1977 -10.50 -10.48 6724
1978 -10.45 -10.28 6724
1979 -10.32 -10.51 6724
1980 -10.18 -10.30 6724
1981 -10.20 -10.11 6724
1982 -10.17 -10.18 6724
1983 -10.19 -10.25 6724
1984 -10.19 -10.50 6724
1985 -10.27 -10.66 6724
1986 -10.14 -10.75 6724
1987 -10.04 -10.69 6724
1988 -9.99 -10.63 6724
1989 -9.97 -10.60 6724
1990 -9.73 -10.56 6724
1991 -9.52 -10.30 6724
1992 -9.36 -10.06 6724
1993 -9.35 -9.64 6724
1994 -9.29 -9.75 6724
1995 -9.06 -9.57 6724
1996 -8.95 -9.49 6724
1997 -8.93 -9.52 6724
1998 -8.96 -9.54 6724
1999 -9.10 -9.66 6724
2000 -9.12 -9.64 6724
Total -10.34 -10.03 262236
 
 
These results exemplify the importance of adopting a methodology that takes into 
account multilateral effects. While our bilateral effects match the literature, our 






The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of foreign aid on trade using the Gravity 
Equation. The choice of this empirical tool is very convenient since, after recent 
theoretical developments, it allows not only to estimate the bilateral effects of foreign aid 
on trade but also to compute general equilibrium comparative statics given that 
multilateral effects are properly tacked in the modeling.  
 
However, the traditional way that the gravity equation is estimated does not take into 
account the fact that aid is usually donated by developed countries to less developed ones 
and these tow groups of countries have different patterns of trade. Given that, we propose 
a more appropriate empirical model that takes these factors into account.  
 
More specifically, we use insights from the foreign aid literature on the channel by which 
aid affects trade, that is, the “bilateral economical and political link” channel, and include 
it in the “trade resistance barriers” concept developed by the gravity equation literature.  
 
The AvW (2003) model, which takes into account both bilateral and multilateral trade 
resistance barriers, is then extended to include the North and the South. Countries in the 
South are assumed to produce homogenous goods and countries in the North 
heterogeneous ones (monopolistic competition), assumptions that result in a gravity 
equation more adequate to our purposes. We also apply B&B (2006) linearization 
technique to increase the clarity and efficiency of our estimations. 
 
Foreign aid has a positive significant impact on exports from the donor to the recipient in 
the estimation framework proposed. Furthermore, this significance survives a series of 
sensitivity analyses proposed, including the use of the estimation procedures discussed by 
Feenstra (2002) and Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). 52 
 
 
The magnitude of the impact is not as striking as the comparative static results. Despite 
its positive bilateral effects, aid affects prices such as to reduce the volume of trade of 
non-donor Northern exporters.  Since most Northern countries are non-donors, the total 
volume of exports from the North actually decreases. 53 
 
Appendix 1: Expanding A&W (2003) Without the Symmetry Assumption 
 
Consider the original A&W (2003) model but without the assumption that tij = tji. The 



































































         
 
Where N is the total number of countries. Note that the model is still symmetric in the 
sense that every country trades in a monopolistic competition framework, importing and 
exporting to and from every country. Following B&B (2006), we expand the equations 
above using a “symmetric world” (page 14) as the center. Denoting the variables at the 
center by  θ , , , t P Π , note that: 
 
θ
σ σ σ 1 1 1 − − − Π = t N P          ( 1 )  
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The log-linear Taylor expansion is then given by: 
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Subtracting 
σ − 1 P  from both sides and then dividing by
σ − 1 P , we have: 54 
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Using the logarithmic on both sides of (1) and replacing in the equation above, we have: 
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Summing (2) across j and (3) across i, we have: 
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These equations are identical. That is expected. Note that, as the system of equations (10) 
and (11) in A&W (2003) has infinite solutions (with or without the assumption that tij = 
tji), so does its expansion. Again, we need a convenient price normalization
31. For any 
given equilibrium and any given λ, if we multiply every price pi by λ, we have the same 
real equilibrium (real bundles), with a different price normalization, where each  j P  is 
multiplied by λ and each Πi is multiplied by 1/ λ (See footnote 12 in A&W, 2003).  Given 
that, for any given equilibrium, consider a price re-normalization such as the product of 
j P  equals the product of  i Π .  To prove that this is possible, we need to find a λ such as 
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Therefore, given any equilibrium, we can always re-normalize prices to obtain the desired 
result. In this case: 
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This implies, using (4) and (5): 
  





















































































































1 θ σ σ
σ  
 
If, for every country i and j, tij = tji, then the two expressions above are identical and we 
are back to the B&B case
32. If that is not the case, the equations above may be different 


















σ .  
 
                                                 
32 Note that imposing  j j P Π =  implies
















, so the price normalization 
proposed by AvW (2003) implies the price normalization proposed here. However, ours do not require 
symmetry.  57 
 
Appendix 2: The Effect of Price Normalizations on the Price Indexes in the Current 
Model 
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The Market clearing conditions can be restated as: 
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∑         ( 6 )  
 
Equations (1) to (5) determine the equilibrium.  Consider now multiplying every pi by 
some constantλ .  By equations (3) and (4), we see that every nominal income is 
multiplied byλ . Besides, by equation (5), it is clear that every j P  is multiplied byλ  as 
well.  Those two facts together imply that equations (1) and (2) are unchanged. 
Therefore, as expected, the real bundles do not change.  58 
 
 
The interesting result is that, in the re-normalized equilibrium, every j P  is multiplied byλ  
and every  i Π is divided by λ , as can be seen in equations (5) and (6). This is similar to 
what happens in AvW’s (2003) model but, in the current case,  i Π is only defined for 
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